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INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE
"IS IT SCIENCE?" QUESTION
JAY D. WEXLER*
A few years ago, at a conference on religion in the public schools
sponsored by the First Amendment Law Review at the University of North
Carolina, I argued that although I thought Judge Jones' opinion in
Kitzmiller' was mostly correct, the judge erred by deciding that Intelligent
Design (ID) is not science.' Although I continue to believe that teaching ID
in public schools is unconstitutional-I have argued this point for a dozen
years and will not reiterate my reasoning here 3-I also continue to agree
with my original assessment of the judge's treatment of the so-called "is it
science?" question. In other words, I continue to believe that this particular
aspect of the decision was unnecessary, unjustified (the judge did not
explain why he was deciding the question), in excess of the judicial role,
and unpersuasive, given the judge's lack of training in the philosophy of
science.4
Also in attendance at the same conference was Richard Katskee, from
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. Katskee was one
of the lawyers for the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller. Katskee criticized my position
and wrote his own article entitled Why it Mattered to Dover that Intelligent
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This paper had its origins, so to speak, as a
presentation I made at a symposium on intelligent design held at Liberty University in February
2009. I thank my fellow participants and the lively, thoughtful audience for comments and
questions that improved my thoughts on this issue significantly.
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Design Isn't Science.5 In the article, he advanced a number of arguments
regarding why Judge Jones was right to decide the question. This piece will
address only one of Katskee's arguments; namely his contention that Judge
Jones owed it to the participants in the case, particularly the defendant
school board, to issue a broad and comprehensive decision that would at
least try to end the controversy over ID across the country.
In Katskee's words, Judge Jones needed to issue a
[D]ecisive ruling that would not only resolve the dispute in Dover,
but also give guidance to other public-school officials elsewhere,
and in the process forge a common understanding that would begin
to heal the religiously based political and social divides that the
school board had wrought in Dover and the ID movement was
attempting to export to other communities across the country.
6
Elsewhere, he said the public had the right to "expect a reasonable return on
the investment [after following the case for close to a year] in the form of a
decision that actually made headway toward resolving the cultural
controversy."7 Put another way, Katskee argued that if the judge had
"dodged" the "is it science?" question, the decision "would have done
nothing to quell a growing political and social controversy that otherwise
would have continued to create religiously based rifts in the social fabric of
communities."8
To put Katskee's words in the context of an ongoing discussion among
judges and scholars over the proper mode for constitutional decision-
making, he was arguing that Judge Jones had an obligation to issue a
"maximalist" decision rather than a "minimalist" one. The terms judicial
minimalism and judicial maximalism originally come from Cass Sunstein,
who first talked about these ideas in the mid-1990s in a book 9 and in the
Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 1995 Supreme Court issue.1"
Minimalism, according to Sunstein, is the "phenomenon of saying no more
than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible
undecided."'" Minimalist decisions are "narrow" in that they only decide
the specific case on its particular facts and do not craft broad rules to govern
a wide range of cases, 2 and "shallow" in that they do not provide deep
5. Richard B. Katskee, Why it Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn't Science, 5
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 112 (2006).
6. Id. at 116.
7. Id. at 158.
8. Id. at 152.
9. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (2001).
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword" Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
11. Id. at 6-7.
12. Id. at 15-20.
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theoretical justifications for outcomes.13 Maximalist decisions, on the other
hand, are both broad and deep: they control a wide range of possible future
cases, and they try to provide deep theoretical justifications for their
outcomes. "
Minimalism has its virtues and disadvantages. According to Sunstein,
and others, minimalism is both democracy-friendly and democracy-forcing
because it "leaves issues open for democratic deliberation ... and ensures
that certain important decisions are made by democratically accountable
actors."'" It also minimizes judicial mistakes. This may be particularly
important in cases surrounded by morally charged disagreement where a
maximalist decision may "activate forces of opposition," "produce an
intense social backlash," and "hinder social deliberation, learning,
compromise, and moral evolution over time." 6 On the other hand,
minimalism has its drawbacks, including increasing the decision costs for
lower courts, practitioners, and individuals who may wish they had
additional judicial guidance regarding what is legal and what is not.'7
Kitzmiller was a maximalist decision. Rather than "leaving as much as
possible undecided," 8 Judge Jones basically left as little as possible
undecided. Generally, you can tell that a decision is going to be maximalist
if it lasts for 139 pages and weighs as much as a small rhinoceros. For one
thing, the decision is broad: it did not limit itself to the facts of the specific
case as it surely could have. This is a particularly easy case from a religious
purpose perspective, given the statements made by board members and the
like. 9 Moreover, Judge Jones attempted to provide a deep theoretical
justification for his outcome by delving into the philosophy of science,
trying to come up with a definition of science, and finding that a field of
inquiry does not count as science."
Kitzmiller should have been decided in a more minimalist fashion. First,
deciding the "is it science?" question was unnecessary. Nothing prohibits
public schools from teaching non-science in their classrooms. If a school
wants to teach philosophy, for example, in a biology or French class, it can.
There is nothing unconstitutional about that. Therefore, deciding ID is not
science did not answer whether Dover could teach ID in its public schools.
The question whether teaching ID promotes or endorses religion remains.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Sunstein, supra note 10 at 33.
17. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298, 305 (1998).
18. Sunstein, supra note 10 at 6-7.
19. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 750-53 (detailing statements made at school board
meeting).
20. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
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Moreover, even if ID is science in some fashion or to some degree, it does
not necessarily follow that it can be taught in public schools. Again, the
question is more nuanced than that. The correct analysis under the Supreme
Court's endorsement test looks at all the circumstances to see if a policy
decision would send a message to a reasonable person that the curriculum
was determined by religion."'
Take this analogy, for instance: a school in a district with a large
number of Chinese Taoists teaches only French and Spanish in its foreign
language department. Many of the students' parents want the school to
teach Japanese or German. They think the students need some other options
to participate in the world community. The school board, however, is
dominated by Taoists who decide that instead of teaching Japanese or
German, like nearly every other school district does, it will teach classical
Chinese. A school board member says that Chuang Tzu "took it on the chin
from the Confucians for us 2500 years ago, let's do something for him." It
is clear that the reason the board chooses classical Chinese is because a
majority of the board members think students should be able to read the Lao
Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, the two classic works of philosophical Taoism.
Non-Taoists in the community feel like this curricular decision was based
on religion. They sue and say the curricular decision endorses Taoism. The
school responds, "But classical Chinese is a language. This is a language
department; end of story." Is the board right? No, of course not. The
question is whether, given all the facts, the board has endorsed religion.
Maybe it has, and maybe it has not. The fact that classical Chinese is a
language does not decide the question at all.
Second, the endorsement test is itself a minimalist test that the Court
has used, presumably because it views (rightly, I think) the questions raised
by disputes over religion as particularly suited to a minimalist approach. By
employing a "look at all the circumstances" test, the Court is basically
directing lower courts to decide questions in a minimalist fashion, based
only on the circumstances before them. Judge Jones arguably departed from
the spirit of the Court's approach to sensitive and controversial questions
regarding religion in the public square by fitting a maximalist analysis into
an area where the Court has signaled the suitability of minimalism.
Finally, and most importantly, the question of how to teach origins in
the public schools is clearly so controversial, so difficult, so fundamental,
so enduring, and so large, that we should encourage more discussion,
discourse, and deliberation, rather than less. The idea suggested by Katskee
that a district court in Pennsylvania could "forge a common understanding,"
"heal social divides," and "resolve" or "quell" the "cultural controversy"
21. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
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over evolution22 is simply wrong. Has Kitzmiller resolved the controversy?
Of course not. No more than the arguably maximalist decisions in
Epperson3 and Edwards24 did, as is now clearly evident.
The evolution controversy is one that the courts can affect but by no
means resolve. The more that courts try to resolve the controversy by
issuing maximalist decisions, the more resistance they are likely to
encounter. Under the criteria for distinguishing the conditions favorable to
minimalism from those favorable to maximalism, the questions of whether
ID is science, and more generally, whether ID violates the First
Amendment, are best suited for minimalist decisions. Kitzmiller, at least in
its discussion of the science issue, took the wrong jurisprudential route.
22. See Katzkee supra note 5 at 116.
23. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding unconstitutional Arkansas' law
prohibiting the teaching of evolution).
24. Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional Louisiana's equal
time for creation science and evolution law).
